What Happens When AI Meets SCADA?
Most SCADA systems run on fixed schedules, reactive alarms, and the idea that ânormalâ is good enough.
But downtime is expensive, and false positives are worse.
Thatâs where AI begins to whisper, not shout.
Detects anomalies before the pressure drops
Reduces alarm floods with context-aware logic
Surfaces patterns that predict tomorrow, not just repeat yesterday
Want to see what real foresight looks like?
Email us at info@scadatend.com
Tðµð² ð¬ð¶ð» ð®ð»ð± ððµð² ð¬ð®ð»ðŽ ðŒð³ ðŠðððð ð£ð¿ðŒð·ð²ð°ðð
ðð©ðŠð³ðŠ ðªð¯ðµðŠðšð³ð¢ðµð°ð³ðŽ ð¢ð¯ð¥ ð€ððªðŠð¯ðµðŽ ð€ðð¢ðŽð©âŠð¢ð¯ð¥ ðžð©ðº ð°ð·ðŠð³ðŽðªðšð©ðµ ðªðŽ ðµð©ðŠ ð®ðªðŽðŽðªð¯ðš ð®ðªð¥ð¥ððŠ.
SCADA projects should be clean.
They should follow logic.
They should run on discipline.
But anyone whoâs been inside one knows the truth:
They often run on ð³ð¿ðððð¿ð®ðð¶ðŒð», ð®ððððºðœðð¶ðŒð»ð, and ð°ðŒð»ð³ð¹ð¶ð°ð.
At the center of it all is a quiet tension no one talks about:
⢠The ð¬ð¶ð»....clients pushing for more, faster, cheaper
⢠The Yð®ð»ðŽ....integrators trying to deliver in chaos
And in between?
No translator. No referee. No one to steady the ship. And the delays and prices can keep going up.
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ð§ðµð² ðð¹ð¶ð²ð»ð (ð§ðµð² âð¬ð¶ð»â)
Wants it done yesterday.
Wants results without the learning curve.
Wants a system that worksâŠ.ð£ð¶ðµ ð¥ð°ðŠðŽð¯âðµ ðžð¢ð¯ðµ ðµð° ð©ðŠð¢ð³ ð¢ð£ð°ð¶ðµ ð±ð°ðððªð¯ðš ð³ð¢ðµðŠðŽ, ðŠð¹ð€ðŠð±ðµðªð°ð¯ ð³ðŠð±ð°ð³ðµðŽ, ðµð¢ðš ð®ð¢ð±ð±ðªð¯ðš, ð°ð³ ð€ð©ð¢ð¯ðšðŠ ð°ð³ð¥ðŠð³ðŽ.
âJust make it work,â they say.
Then they wonder why it doesnât perfectly fit their operations six months later.
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ð§ðµð² ðð»ðð²ðŽð¿ð®ððŒð¿ (ð§ðµð² âð¬ð®ð»ðŽâ)
Buried in vague specs.
Racing deadlines with shifting targets.
Trying to deliver functionality that no one has fully defined.
âThis isnât what we asked for,â the client says.
But no one wrote down what they ð¢ð€ðµð¶ð¢ðððº ð¯ðŠðŠð¥ðŠð¥.
The integrator gets blamed. The client gets frustrated.
The control room inherits a fragile system.
And the cycle starts again on the next project.
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ðªðµð®ðâð ð ð¶ððð¶ð»ðŽ? ð¢ðð²ð¿ðð¶ðŽðµð.
Not a middleman.
Not more meetings.
Not another layer of approval.
Whatâs missing is someone who speaks both languages:
⢠The engineerâs language
⢠The operatorâs language
⢠The executiveâs language
⢠The integratorâs language
SCADATend was built to fill that space.
We donât program systems.
We ð°ð®ð» ðµð²ð¹ðœ ðð¶ððµ ððµð² ððœ-ð³ð¿ðŒð»ð ðœð®ðœð²ð¿ððŒð¿ðž, ðð®ðð°ðµ ððµð² ðµð®ð»ð±ðŒð³ð³ð, ðð¿ð®ð°ðž ððµð² ðð°ðŒðœð², ð®ð»ð± ð°ð®ðð°ðµ ððµð² ðºð¶ðð®ð¹ð¶ðŽð»ðºð²ð»ðð before disasters occur.
We sit between the yin and the yangâŠ.and we make sure both sides walk away with something that actually works.
ð§ðµð² ðŠðððð ðŠðžð¶ð¹ð¹ð ðð®ðœ ðð ð¥ð²ð®ð¹âðð»ð± ðð²ððð¶ð»ðŽ ðªðŒð¿ðð².
ððŠðµð© ðð¢ð¯ðš, ðð, ðŽð¶ð®ð®ðŠð¥ ðªðµ ð¶ð± ð±ðŠð³ð§ðŠð€ðµððº:
"ðð¶ð±ðŠð³ð·ðªðŽð°ð³ðº ðð°ð¯ðµð³ð°ð ð¢ð¯ð¥ ðð¢ðµð¢ ðð€ð²ð¶ðªðŽðªðµðªð°ð¯ (ððððð) ðŽðºðŽðµðŠð®ðŽ ð¢ð¯ð¥ ðªð¯ð¥ð¶ðŽðµð³ðªð¢ð ð¢ð¶ðµð°ð®ð¢ðµðªð°ð¯ ðªðŽ ðšð³ð°ðžðªð¯ðš. ðð°ðžðŠð·ðŠð³, ð¢ð¯ ð¢ðð¢ð³ð®ðªð¯ðš ðµð³ðŠð¯ð¥ ðªðŽ ðŠð®ðŠð³ðšðªð¯ðš ðžð©ðŠð³ðŠ ðµð©ðŠ ð¯ð¶ð®ð£ðŠð³ ð°ð§ ð²ð¶ð¢ððªð§ðªðŠð¥ ð±ðŠð³ðŽð°ð¯ð¯ðŠð ð§ð¢ð®ðªððªð¢ð³ ðžðªðµð© ðµð©ðŠðŽðŠ ð€ð³ðªðµðªð€ð¢ð ðŽðºðŽðµðŠð®ðŽ ðªðŽ ðŽðµðŠð¢ð¥ðªððº ð¥ðŠð€ððªð¯ðªð¯ðš. ðð©ðªðŽ ðŽð¬ðªðððŽ ðšð¢ð± ð±ð³ðŠðŽðŠð¯ðµðŽ ðŽðªðšð¯ðªð§ðªð€ð¢ð¯ðµ ð€ð©ð¢ðððŠð¯ðšðŠðŽ ð§ð°ð³ ðªð¯ð¥ð¶ðŽðµð³ðªðŠðŽ ð³ðŠððºðªð¯ðš ð°ð¯ ð¢ð¶ðµð°ð®ð¢ðµðªð°ð¯ ð§ð°ð³ ðŠð§ð§ðªð€ðªðŠð¯ð€ðº, ð³ðŠððªð¢ð£ðªððªðµðº, ð¢ð¯ð¥ ð¢ð¶ðµð°ð®ð¢ðµðªð°ð¯ ðŽðºðŽðµðŠð®ðŽ ð¢ð³ðŠ ðšðŠðµðµðªð¯ðš ð®ð°ð³ðŠ ð€ð°ð®ð±ððŠð¹, ðžð©ðªððŠ ðµð©ðŠ ð±ðŠð°ð±ððŠ ðžð©ð° ðµð³ð¶ððº ð¶ð¯ð¥ðŠð³ðŽðµð¢ð¯ð¥ ðµð©ðŠð® ð¢ð³ðŠ ðšðŠðµðµðªð¯ðš ð©ð¢ð³ð¥ðŠð³ ðµð° ð§ðªð¯ð¥."
Weâre seeing the effects every day:
⢠Bad handoffs
⢠Insufficient commissioning/point-to-point verification
⢠Scope drift
⢠Lack of Oil and Gas operational understanding
⢠Lack of scope leading to unproductive staff and contractors
⢠Incomplete commissioning
⢠Systems that look fine⊠until they donât
If youâre feeling that skills gap in your SCADA projectâand not seeing results, SCADATend was built for that exact pressure point.
ðð²ðâð ðð®ð¹ðž. ðªð²âðð² ðŽðŒð ððŒðr ðŒðð²ð¿ðð¶ðŽðµð.
ðªðµð®ð ð® ðªð²ð¯ðð¶ðð² ðð¹ð¶ðð°ðµ ð¥ð²ðºð¶ð»ð±ð²ð± ð ð² ðð¯ðŒðð ðŠðððð ð£ð¿ðŒð·ð²ð°ðs
Last night, the SCADATend website looked⊠bad. Text overlapping. Layout chaos. It was clearly broken.
Because I asked Kimra, whoâs excellent with contracts but not websites, to tweak a few things for mobile. And I didnât check it. On purpose.
I wanted to prove something.
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ð§ðµð¶ð ð¶ð ð²ð
ð®ð°ðð¹ð ððµð®ð ðµð®ðœðœð²ð»ð ðŒð» ðŠðððð ðœð¿ðŒð·ð²ð°ðð ððµð²ð»:
⢠Roles arenât clearly defined
⢠Scope isnât documented
⢠Deliverables arenât verified
⢠And no oneâs watching the handoffs
Everyoneâs doing their best, but outside their lane, with no system to catch it. And thatâs when the mess begins.
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ðªð² ðð²ð² ð¶ð ð¶ð» ððµð² ð³ð¶ð²ð¹ð± ð®ð¹ð¹ ððµð² ðð¶ðºð²:
⢠Bad handoffs
⢠Incomplete commissioning
⢠Undefined or shifting scope
⢠Lack of operational understanding
⢠Unproductive time spent solving the wrong problems
⢠Systems that look fine⊠until they donât
I fixed the website in 10 minutes.
In the field? That same mistake might cost $10,000. Or 10 hours of downtime. Or worse.
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And hereâs one more lessonâmaybe the most important one:
Kimra changed text on the mobile version, but it broke the desktop version too.
One change, in one place, impacted everything.
Thatâs how SCADA works. Thatâs how real systems behave.
And thatâs why oversight isn't extraâit's essential.
If you're dealing with complexity like this and donât have someone watching the structure, you're not just running blindâyou're running risky.
Weâve got your oversight.
ðð¡ð² ðððŠðšðð ððððð ðð²ð¬ðððŠð¬ ðð«ð ðð§ððð« ððšð§ð¬ððð§ð ðððððð€
Oil fields, saltwater disposal sites, gathering stations, and compressor sites are often miles from the nearest town. That isolation breeds a fatal kind of confidence:
ðððð¥-ððšð«ð¥ð ðð«ðšðšð: ðð¢ð¯ð ðððð€ ðððððŠð©ðð¬, ððšð§ð¬ððð§ðð¥ð²
One SCADA system was tied directly to the internet â no encryption, no VPN, no segmentation. When I challenged it, they replied: âNobodyâs looking for us.â
Using Wireshark it was noticed at any given moment, ð®ð§ð¢ðªð®ð ððšð§ð§ðððð¢ðšð§ð¬ ð°ðð«ð ðð«ð²ð¢ð§ð ððš ððšðŠðŠð®ð§ð¢ðððð ð°ð¢ðð¡ ðð¡ð ððððð ð¬ð²ð¬ðððŠâ and the vast majority were from overseas. These werenât casual pings. They were scripted attacks, port scans, brute force login attempts, and protocol-level pokes aimed at known ICS vulnerabilities.
ðð¡ð ðð«ð®ðð¡: ðððð€ðð«ð¬ ðð§ðšð° ðð¡ðð«ð ðð¡ð ð
ð¢ðð¥ðð¬ ðð«ð
Modern threat actors donât just launch blanket scans â they:
⢠Know where U.S. energy fields are located
⢠Understand who the local ISPs are
⢠Know IP range allocations by provider and region
⢠Target oil & gas because of the ðððð ð¯ðð¥ð®ð, ð®ð©ðð¢ðŠð ð«ððªð®ð¢ð«ððŠðð§ð, ðð§ð ð¥ðšð°
ððððð§ð¬ð ðŠððð®ð«ð¢ðð²
They hit everything, hoping one open port leads to everything else.
ð
ð«ðšðŠ ðð¢ðð«ðšð¬ðšðð 365 ððš ððððð: ððšð° ðððððð€ð¬ ðð«ðð¯ðð¥ ð
ð®ð«ðð¡ðð« ðð¡ðð§ ððšð® ðð¡ð¢ð§ð€
The path to compromising your SCADA system might start with something as simple as a Microsoft 365 email or the one MS Office app we all love to use Excel.
Threat actors conduct recon, compromise accounts via phishing or leaked credentials and application vulnerabilities, and then leverage:
⢠ðð«ð®ðð ððšð«ðð ðððððð€ð¬
⢠ððð®ðð¡ ððšð€ðð§ ð¡ð¢ð£ððð€ð¢ð§ð
⢠ððšð§ð¬ðð§ð ð©ð¡ð¢ð¬ð¡ð¢ð§ð
⢠ððððð«ðð¥ ðŠðšð¯ððŠðð§ð ð¯ð¢ð ðððð¢ð¯ð ðð¢ð«ððððšð«ð² (Activw Directory has received STIGs)
And hereâs the kicker â ðšð§ðð ðð¡ðð²âð«ð ð¢ð§ð¬ð¢ðð ð ððšð«ð©ðšð«ððð ððð§ðð§ð, many systems, including SCADA support servers, historian nodes, or even field laptops that sync via OneDrive or SharePoint,ððððšðŠð ð«ðððð¡ððð¥ð.
Microsoft has confirmed that since late 2023, attacks on internet-exposed OT systems â including water, wastewater, and energy â have grown rapidly. State-sponsored groups like ðð²ððð«ðð¯3ð§ð ðð«ð¬ ðð§ð ð©ð«ðš-ðð®ð¬ð¬ð¢ðð§ ððððšð«ð¬ ðð«ð ðððð¢ð¯ðð¥ð² ð¬ððð§ð§ð¢ð§ð ððšð« ðð§ð ðð±ð©ð¥ðšð¢ðð¢ð§ð ðð¡ðð¬ð ð¬ðšðð ð¬ð©ðšðð¬.
ð
ð¢ðð¥ð-ððð¯ðð¥ ðððð®ð«ð¢ðð² ðð®ð¬ð ðð ðð«ððððð ðð¬ ðð«ð¢ðð¢ððð¥
What works:
â¢ððððð¬ ðð©ð©ð¥ð¢ðð ððš ðð¢ðð¥ð ðððð¬, ð¥ðð©ððšð©ð¬, ð¬ð°ð¢ððð¡ðð¬, ðð§ð ð©ð«ðšððšððšð¥ð¬
⢠ððš ðšð©ðð§ ð¢ð§ððð«ð§ðð ðð±ð©ðšð¬ð®ð«ð â ðð¯ðð«
⢠ðð¬ð ðšð ð©ð«ð¢ð¯ððð ðððð¬, ððð ðð®ð§ð§ðð¥ð¬, ðð§ð ðð§ðð«ð²ð©ððð ð©ð«ðšððšððšð¥ð¬
⢠ðð¡ðð§ð ð ððšð§ðð«ðšð¥ ðð§ð ðð¥ðð«ðð¢ð§ð ððšð« ðð¯ðð«ð² ððšð§ðð¢ð ð®ð«ððð¢ðšð§ ð©ð®ð¬ð¡
⢠ððšð ð ð¢ð§ð ð¢ð§ððšð®ð§ð ððšð«ðð¢ð ð§ ððð¬, ðð¯ðð§ ððð¢ð¥ðð ðððððŠð©ðð¬
Youâre not âtoo smallâ or âtoo remote.â Youâre exposed â and the bad guys already know it.
Our country runs on them critical infrasturcture. Our economy relies on it. And our adversaries know it.
ððšð¬ð ððšðŠðŠðð«ðð¢ðð¥ ðð§ð¯ð¢ð«ðšð§ðŠðð§ðð¬ ð¬ð€ð¢ð© ððððð¬ ðð¥ððšð ððð¡ðð«.
Some barely know what they are.
And the real security? Itâs just assumed.
But hereâs the uncomfortable truth:
ðð¡ð ðððððð€ðð«ð¬ ð«ððð ðð¡ð ððððð¬ ððšðš.
They use them to find what you havenât fixed.
And they donât care if it breaks your software â they want it broken.
Boards donât respond to risk charts â they respond to cost.
Would you spend 100 hours hardening a system to avoid a $3M breach?
Thatâs the conversation every company needs to have.
ðð§ ðð¡ð ðšð¢ð¥ ðð§ð ð ðð¬ ð¢ð§ðð®ð¬ðð«ð², ð§ðð ð¥ðððð¢ð§ð ðððð ððšðŠð©ð¥ð¢ðð§ðð ððð§ ðð±ð©ðšð¬ð ðð«ð¢ðð¢ððð¥ ð¢ð§ðð«ðð¬ðð«ð®ððð®ð«ð ððš ðð²ððð« ðð¡ð«ðððð¬, ð«ðð ð®ð¥ðððšð«ð² ð©ðð§ðð¥ðð¢ðð¬, ðð§ð ðšð©ðð«ððð¢ðšð§ðð¥ ðð¢ð¬ð«ð®ð©ðð¢ðšð§ð¬.Given the sector's reliance on SCADA systems for monitoring and control, failing to implement STIGs can lead to vulnerabilities )
ð
ðšð« ðð±ððŠð©ð¥ð, ðð²ððð«ð¬ððð®ð«ð¢ðð² ð«ð¢ð¬ð€ð¬ ð¢ð§ ðšð¢ð¥ ðð§ð ð ðð¬ ðð«ð ð¢ð§ðð«ððð¬ð¢ð§ð ð¥ð² ð¬ðð«ð®ðð¢ð§ð¢ð³ðð ðð®ð ððš ðð¡ð ð¢ð§ðð®ð¬ðð«ð²'ð¬ ð«ðšð¥ð ð¢ð§ ð§ððð¢ðšð§ðð¥ ð¬ððð®ð«ð¢ðð² ðð§ð ðððšð§ðšðŠð¢ð ð¬ðððð¢ð¥ð¢ðð².A lack of standardized security measures, such as STIGs, can result in compliance failures, data breaches, and even operational shutdowns.
ðŠð§ðð: ðð'ð ð¡ðŒð ðððð ð³ðŒð¿ ðð²ð±ð²ð¿ð®ð¹ ð¡ð²ðððŒð¿ðžð ðð»ððºðŒð¿ð²
Iâve talked about STIG-based system hardening and its role in SCADA.
If youâve been following along, you already know this:
â Firewalls and segmentation ð®ð¿ð² ð»ðŒð ð²ð»ðŒððŽðµ
â Many attacks ð±ðŒð»âð ð°ðŒðºð² ð³ð¿ðŒðº ððµð² ðŒðððð¶ð±ð²
â And no, your remote site is ð»ðŒð ð¶ð»ðð¶ðð¶ð¯ð¹ð²
What STIG brings to the table is ð¿ð¶ðŽðŒð¿âa level of hardening that actually limits software-based exploits, slows lateral movement, and locks down vulnerable paths ð¯ð²ð³ðŒð¿ð² theyâre hit.
Most companies donât implement it because:
1. It takes ð²ð
ðœð²ð¿ðð¶ðð²
2. It takes ð²ð³ð³ðŒð¿ð
3 It is ðð¶ðºð² ð°ðŒð»ðððºð¶ð»ðŽ.
4. And itâs ð»ðŒð ð¿ð²ðŸðð¶ð¿ð²ð±âyet
Hardening servers and workstations is more than talking about theoryâI mean real-world, boots-on-the-ground examples of what works (and what fails) when it comes to hardening OT infrastructure. Next week, Iâll be shifting focus to ðœð¿ðŒð·ð²ð°ð ð¿ð¶ððž ðºð¶ðð¶ðŽð®ðð¶ðŒð» ð®ð»ð± ðŒðœð²ð¿ð®ðð¶ðŒð»ð®ð¹ ð®ð¹ð¶ðŽð»ðºð²ð»ð. The kind of practical stuff that makes or breaks SCADA success.
Would you be interested in a ðð²ð¯-ð¯ð®ðð²ð± ð°ð¹ð®ðð ðŒð¿ ð¿ðŒðð»ð±ðð®ð¯ð¹ð² ð±ð¶ðð°ðððð¶ðŒð» ðŒð» ðŠð§ðð ð¶ðºðœð¹ð²ðºð²ð»ðð®ðð¶ðŒð» ð¶ð» ðŠðððð ð²ð»ðð¶ð¿ðŒð»ðºð²ð»ðð?
ðð³ ððµð®ðâð ððŒðºð²ððµð¶ð»ðŽ ððŒð'ð± ð³ð¶ð»ð± ðð®ð¹ðð² ð¶ð», email me walter@scadatend.com
Iâm exploring how to structure it, and your feedback matters.
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Inquires email: info@scadatend.com
ð 405-363-9779 | âïž walter@scadatend.com
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